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Abstract
Despite the fact that the World Wide Web is an untrusted environment, increasing use is being made
of this network (the Internet) in electronic commerce applications. To prevent attacks a strong security
architecture is required. A fundamental part of such an architecture is a method for key management. This
paper discusses the various components of cryptographic key management especially in relation to the World
Wide Web environment. Issues and problems with key generation, key distribution and key storage are
raised. An overview is presented of key management systems in several security architectures including SSL,
Kerberos and Sesame.
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1 Introduction
Many modern applications are reliant upon
cryptographic systems for the provision of se-
curity services such as confidentiality, integrity,
authentication and non-repudiation. Regardless
of whether the type of cryptographic algorithm
used is symmetric or asymmetric, and regardless
of the specific algorithm used, all cryptographic
systems are reliant on the use of one or more
cryptographic keys. An important component
of such a system is a secure method to manage
these keys.
With the increased network connectivity avail-
able today, applications such as electronic com-
merce, home shopping, banking and share trad-
ing are becoming more widely used. These appli-
cations are typically being provided using a non-
trusted distributed network environment such as
the Internet. The World Wide Web is perhaps
the most common method for delivering such
applications, with a wide range of transactional
applications being available today.
This article discusses the concepts of secure
cryptographic key management in a non-trusted
distributed environment such as the World Wide
Web. It commences with a brief discussion on
the principles of secure key management and
why secure key management is a problem in a
non-trusted distributed environment. A discus-
sion is given of the three distinct areas of key
management, namely key generation, key dis-
tribution and key storage, with reference to this
particular environment. Examples of how key
management is used in selected applications,
and examples of current schemes are provided.
Preprint submitted to Elsevier Preprint 29 January 1999
2 Principles of Secure Key Management
Key management plays a crucial role in any se-
curity architecture. Unless secure key manage-
ment techniques are used, a security system may
be exposed to attack despite the fact that strong
cryptographic algorithms are used. This is espe-
cially the case in an untrustworthy environment
such as the World Wide Web. Key management
is concerned with the generation, distribution
and storage of cryptographic keys.
Additionally, each of these processes must be
controlled by a suitable security policy. It should
be noted that prior to designing a key manage-
ment scheme for a security architecture a secu-
rity policy for this architecture should be pro-
vided. This policy should identify the threats
for which the security architecture is aiming to
guard against.
In relation to key management this security pol-
icy should identify the procedures to be con-
ducted as well as describe the responsibilities
and accountability of the different users. In ad-
dition the security policy should identify the au-
dit requirements.
2.1 Key Generation
Secure key generation is the foundation of any
key management scheme. Keys should be gener-
ated in an unpredictable fashion. Cryptographic
keys should be generated in such a manner that
each of the possible keys is easily likely to occur.
The keys should be generated in such a fash-
ion that knowledge of one key should not pro-
vide any knowledge about any other keys. The
key generation process should involve the use
of random or pseudorandom bit sequences. The
most important measure of random sequences
for cryptographic applications is entropy which
gives an indication of the number of indepen-
dent bits in a sequence, i.e. a sequence of n bits
from a truly random source has entropy equal to
n bits. A more detailed description of key gen-
eration will be presented in Section 4.
2.2 Key Distribution
Cryptographic keys need to be distributed be-
tween two users in a secure fashion. If two users
already share a cryptographic key then this
process is greatly simplified. However, in a dis-
tributed environment it may not be reasonable
to assume that two users share a secret key ini-
tially. Hence the process of key distribution in
such a network is more difficult. It may not be
possible to use a trusted courier to transfer keys
between two users. As well in many cases keys
should be distributed in such a fashion that
compromise of one key should not influence the
security of other keys.
Key distribution in many cases involves the use
of intricate cryptographic protocols. There are
two types of protocols which are used, namely
key transport protocols and key agreement pro-
tocols. In key transport protocols one user se-
lects the key and transports it securely to the
other user. In a key agreement each user con-
tributes to the generation of keys. Key distribu-
tion will be described in more detail in Section 5.
2.3 Key Storage
Keys need to be stored in a secure manner in
such a fashion that they will not be revealed to
an unauthorised person. In general this is a diffi-
cult task in a distributed environment if the keys
are stored in an insecure workstation. In order to
provide a secure storage method it may be nec-
essary to use a tamper resistant device such as
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a smart card. In certain circumstances key stor-
age may need to involve the use of auditing pro-
cesses such as archival and recovery mechanisms
as in some cases the keys may need to be stored
for archival measures for a long time. The key
recovery mechanisms may be needed in case of
equipment failure, or they may also be required
for legal reasons. As well, key storage may re-
quire mechanisms for destroying cryptographic
keys when their use is no longer required. A more
detailed description of key storage is presented
in Section 6.
3 Problems with Non-Trusted Dis-
tributed Environments
Key management is difficult in a non-trusted
distributed environment. This is caused by the
two key factors, non-trusted and distributed. Key
management is significantly easier in an environ-
ment where the communications, users and sys-
tem administrators are trusted. Such trust does
not generally exist on the World Wide Web.
On the Internet (and therefore the World Wide
Web) network communications (and thus secu-
rity critical data) can and does travel through a
multitude of often unknown and untrusted sys-
tems. There is no guarantee that transmitted
data has not been intercepted or modified by
an untrusted system. There is also no guarantee
that any received data did in fact originate from
the system that claims to have sent the data.
In such a non-trusted environment, users are also
generally untrusted. Users are typically dealing
with faceless entities that may not necessarily
have any existence outside the electronic envi-
ronment. It is difficult to trust an entity that
you have never met or visited before, whose only
proof of legitimacy is that of a pattern of bits
in a computer system. This applies not only to
the faceless individual, but also to the faceless
large organisation. Not only do large organisa-
tions (or electronic merchants) have to trust in-
dividual users, but individual users equally need
to trust the purported organisations. Such trust
is generally not forthcoming on the Internet, ex-
cept by unknowledgeable or na¨ıve users.
It is also often the case that system administra-
tors cannot be trusted. In almost every system,
it is possible for the administrator to view all
data files stored on that system.
Because of the distributed nature of the World
Wide Web, at least some, if not most, of the com-
munication channels, users and systems will be
outside the control of the participating entities.
The lack of ability to trust in the above means
that not only must cryptographic mechanisms
be used to protect the applications, but appro-
priate security must also be in place to protect
the cryptographic keys.
4 Key Generation
The generation of random keying data for cryp-
tographic applications is a difficult task. Sources
of truly random data are not always readily
available and therefore there is a heavy reliance
on pseudo-random number generators for creat-
ing sequences of random data for keying ciphers.
A pseudo-random generator requires an initial
seed, from which the subsequent random data
is derived. The security of the generator, then,
relies on the randomness and length of the seed
and the properties of the particular generation
algorithm.
The process of generating random data can be
broken into two phases:
Phase 1. The first phase is the generation of
seeding (or keying) data for the random num-
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ber generator. This data must be obtained
from a reliable random source. Depending on
the entropy of the source, the bits may be
used directly, or they may be hashed with
some cryptographically secure algorithm or
compressed to remove redundancy.
Phase 2. If the data obtained from Phase 1 is
sufficient for the required application then no
further processing is required. If more (per-
haps even a continuous supply of) data is re-
quired then other techniques which utilise de-
terministic processes must be used. The ran-
dom data from Phase 1 may be used to seed
a pseudo-random generator in order to pro-
vide a continuous (but not infinite) sequence
of random material. As well, the seed output
from Phase 1 may be input into a hash func-
tion. This may be the case for example when
in order to be confident of generating a key
with n bits of entropy it may be required to
collect much more than n bits from the ran-
dom number generator.
It is important to note that the deterministic
processes described above in Phase 2 will not
increase the entropy. The only method to ob-
tain entropy is to use a random process. Various
sources of random bits have been proposed. Ded-
icated hardware devices can be reliable but may
be impractical due to cost or physical computer
limitations. On the other hand, software sources
are readily available but are less reliable in pro-
viding data which is truly random. The distinc-
tion between hardware and software sources of
random data is somewhat fuzzy. Oftentimes a
hardware device (such as a keyboard, a mouse or
a hard disk drive) is monitored by a software ap-
plication which interprets the signals sent from
the device and then outputs the random data.
The software may also be used to remove redun-
dancy from the received signal if the source is
not truly random. In each of the following ex-
amples the entropy of the data from the random
source should be tested to determine if removal
of redundancy is required. Possible sources of
random data are:
• Radioactive sources: A radioactive element
decays randomly over time, emitting radioac-
tive particles. These particles can be counted
and the rate of their emission calculated in or-
der to provide highly random data.
• Semiconductors: A noisy diode or resistor
may be a very effective source of random data.
Such devices are not expensive.
• Disk drives: In [4], it was shown that there
is a random variation in the rotation speed
of a sealed hard disk drive due to air turbu-
lence. Using low level timing measurements
on a dedicated disk drive proves to be an ex-
cellent source of random data. It is important
the drive not be used for any other purpose
(for example, storing data) since such activity
could adversely affect the randomness of the
output - either by unintentional use or by a
malicious entity influencing the performance
of the disk.
• Mouse movement: The location of a mouse
pointer within a computer screen and the
times between movements have been pro-
posed as a good source of random data. This
approach may work well if, as suggested in
[9], the user is asked to sign their name (us-
ing a mouse or joystick). However, it has
been pointed out that care must be taken
with particular applications since the num-
ber of possible mouse strokes required by the
application may be small, making the users
responses predictable. This is especially im-
portant in network applications (for example,
Web Browsers) where an attacker may glean
information by monitoring the network [4].
• Keystroke timings: A user may be asked to
type a random sequence of characters while
the time between successive keystrokes is
recorded and used to generate random data.
The randomness of this data depends on the
precision and reliability of the clock used for
timing and the users’ typing characteristics.
• Network traffic: The statistics of the traffic
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of a computer network has been proposed as a
source of random data. This approach should
not be considered secure as others with access
to the network can monitor and influence the
traffic on the network.
• Microphones: Background noise obtained
from a microphone may provide a suitable
source of random data. Also, the port of an
unplugged microphone can provide noise. A
Sun SPARCStation has the device /dev/audio
which can be used easily to gather such data.
• System time: Programmers requiring ran-
dom number generators for software simula-
tions, etc., frequently use the system time as
a seed and a system pseudo-random number
generator. Such an approach by itself is inap-
propriate for cryptographic applications since
the time is predictable, as are the pseudo-
random number generators provided by com-
mon compilers.
• High frequency clock: The Intel Pentium
range of processors contain a 64 bit counter
register (called a Time Stamp Counter) which
is incremented upon each internal proces-
sor clock cycle. For example, on a 200MHz
processor the register will be incremented
many times every second. Even though any
system timer is deterministic (and therefore
predictable), if read at irregular intervals (for
example, upon a human keystroke) their val-
ues may reveal usable entropy.
None of the random sources listed above provide
a simple mechanism for collecting good data.
It would be useful if the producers of micro-
processors (used in all computers) incorporated
a small, inexpensive semiconductor capable of
generating random bits. It would then be simple
for the developers of operating systems to pro-
vide a mechanism by which a programmer could
easily access the random data.
The difficulty of finding suitable seeding mate-
rial for random number generators is highlighted
by the number of attacks on existing systems
which have been published. Typically, the bits
obtained from the sources outlined above are not
independent. Calculating the entropy of the col-
lected data gives an indication of the number
of independent bits. If the entropy is low then
the amount of usable random data obtained may
be insufficient for a particular application, in
which case the random data can be used to seed
a pseudo-random number generator which will
produce the required amount of information.
Many pseudo-random number generators exist
but not all are suitable for cryptographic ap-
plications. The algorithm used must have good
properties and the seeding data used by the algo-
rithm must be truly random. It is essential that
the source of the seed be totally unpredictable
to prevent an attacker from guessing it. It is also
important that the length of the seed required by
the pseudo-random number generator be large
enough to prevent an attacker exhaustively try-
ing all seeds. When a cipher is used to generate
random data the seed is usually used as a key
for the cipher in which case the required length
of the seed is dictated by the key size of the
cipher. Ciphers are usually designed with keys
large enough to prevent them being determined
by an exhaustive attack.
Hardware devices such as smart cards may have
some random seed data programmed into them
at production time or they may have their own
genuine noise source on the card (such as a
semiconductor of some type). Such data may be
used to seed a pseudo-random number generator
which runs on the hardware in the card.
It is important to ensure that random num-
bers generated satisfy randomness properties.
Black-box methods to test the generating device
for randomness properties are described in [5]
and [6]. It is recommended that these proce-
dures be applied as a first-step in analysing the
strength of the key generating algorithm. If such
an algorithm fails to satisfy these tests, then
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it is recommended that it should not be used
for the generation of keys where the secrecy of
information is paramount. To gain a true un-
derstanding of the actual entropy it is necessary
to be provided with the actual source code, or
complete description of the method, used to
generate random numbers. This allows an ana-
lyst to conduct an in-depth examination of the
technique used to generate random numbers.
5 Key Distribution
In this section we discuss techniques for estab-
lishing a secret key between two parties who
wish to communicate securely. This secret key is
typically used to secure a cryptographic session,
i.e. a session key. Typically the key distribution
phase incorporates some kind of authentication
mechanisms so that each party can be assured
of the identity of the other. In many cases key
distribution schemes can be generalised to allow
for the establishment of a key between two or
more parties but in this paper we limit ourselves
to the case of two parties. As mentioned in Sec-
tion 2.2, there are two types of key distribution
schemes: key transport protocols and key agree-
ment protocols. Each of these schemes are now
described in some detail.
5.1 Key Transport Protocols
In key transport protocols one party is respon-
sible for generating the session key and trans-
mitting it securely to the other parties that re-
quire it. The key should be generated using a
technique similar to the ones described above in
Section 4. Secure transmission of the key to the
other party can be achieved using either sym-
metric cryptography or asymmetric cryptogra-
phy.
When symmetric cryptography is used, a trusted
server is required, which shares long-term secret
keys with each of the parties wishing to com-
municate in the session. The trusted server usu-
ally generates the required session key and dis-
tributes it to each party, protected with the long-
term key that is shared with that party. This
process is outlined in Example 1. Note that in all
the examples below, as is standard when describ-
ing cryptographic protocols, A stands for Alice
and B stands for Bob. Hence, keys belonging to
Alice (A) are referred to as “hers” and keys be-
longing to Bob (B) are referred to as “his”.
Example 1 Assume parties A and B wish to
establish a session key. A shares a long-term se-
cret key, KAS, with the trusted server, S, and B
shares a long-term secret key, KBS, with S.
(1) A sends a message to S requesting a session
key for communication with B.
(2) S generates a session key KAB.
(3) S encrypts KAB using KAS and sends the
result to A.
(4) S encrypts KAB using KBS and sends the
result to B.
(5) A and B decrypt KAB using their respective
long-term keys (shared with S).
When asymmetric cryptography is used, no
trusted server is required, i.e. the session key
can be generated and distributed directly to
the other party. The transmitted session key
is usually protected using the public key of its
recipient. The sender of the key may optionally
sign the transmitted data with their private key,
providing the recipient with the ability to verify
who sent it. An example of a key transport pro-
tocol which utilises asymmetric cryptography is
the Needham-Schroeder public key protocol [14]
which is described now in Example 2.
Example 2 In this example each party sends a
symmetric key to the other. This need not be the
case – that is, only one key need be communi-
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cated if that is all that is required. This protocol
provides mutual authentication.
(1) A generates a session key KAB.
(2) A encrypts KAB using the public key of B
and sends it, along with her identity, to B.
(3) B generates a session key KBA.
(4) B decrypts KAB using his private key and
sends both KAB and KBA to A, encrypted
under A’s public key.
(5) A decrypts KAB and KBA using her private
key and verifies that the received KAB is the
same as the one sent to B in Step 2.
(6) A encrypts KBA with B’s public key and
sends it back to B.
(7) B decrypts KBA with his private key and
verifies that it is the same as the one sent to
A in Step 4.
There are advantages and disadvantages of each
of these two forms of key transport in an un-
trusted distributed environment. One advan-
tage of the first protocol is that the generation
of session keys is greatly simplified since it is
only necessary to have the trusted server gen-
erate these keys. Hence, it is only necessary to
place a dedicated device to generate keys as
described in Section 4 at this server. However,
fundamental problems with this protocol are
that a trusted server is required and that each
of the users must share a long term secret key
with the trusted server. This requirement is not
possible in the World Wide Web for many ap-
plications especially if one considers the case
of international electronic commerce. On the
other hand, the second protocol does not have
this problem since no trusted server is required.
However, there are several disadvantages with
this protocol since it involves the use of pub-
lic key algorithms. These algorithms usually
require greater bandwidth and computational
effort than symmetric algorithms.
Another problem with public key algorithms is
that a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is re-
quired – for example a certification authority
(CA) is needed to certify the public key of each
user. A certificate is a signed data structure
which provides assurance between an entity and
its alleged public key. There are many issues to
finalise before a PKI is used on the Internet.
For example, the type, format and legal status
of certificates need to be resolved. Currently,
there are several working groups investigating
the design of such certificates including the In-
ternet Engineering Task Force (IETF) [11] and
the Open Group [15].
5.2 Key Agreement Protocols
In contrast to key transport protocols, key
agreement protocols require input from each
of the parties in the generation of the session
key. These protocols generally utilise public key
cryptography. Probably the best known key
agreement protocol is the Diffie-Hellman key
agreement scheme [8]. The following example
presents a key agreement scheme based on the
Diffie-Hellman scheme known as the Station-to-
Station protocol (STS) [13].
Example 3 This example presents the Station-
to-Station protocol which gives key agreement
and at the same time, mutual entity authenti-
cation. Prior to establishing a session key the
following public parameters must be set: a prime,
p, and a generator, α of Z∗p (2 ≤ α ≤ p − 2).
It is also assumed that A and B each possess
a public/private key pair and that each trusts
the public key of the other. The protocol then
progresses as follows:
(1) A chooses a random secret x (1 ≤ x ≤ p−2)
and sends αx mod p to B.
(2) B chooses a random secret y (1 ≤ y ≤ p−2)
and computes αy mod p. B computes the
session key, K, by raising αx mod p (re-
ceived from A) to the power y (mod p). B
7
also forms a signature (using his private
key) of αy and αx concatenated which he en-
crypts with the session key, K. B then for-
wards αy mod p and the encrypted signature
to A.
(3) A computes the session key, K, by raising
αy mod p (received from B) to the power
x (mod p) and then decrypts the encrypted
signature (also received from B) which can
then be verified. WhenB’s message has been
successfully verified, A generates a similar
message by forming a signature of αx con-
catenated with αy and encrypting it with the
session key, K. A then sends the encrypted
signature to B.
(4) B then decrypts the incoming message us-
ing K and verifies the signature contained
within. If the signature is successfully veri-
fied then both A and B can be satisfied that
the other has the session key, K.
The protocol in Example 3 has the same advan-
tages as described above for Example 2 in that
no trusted server is required. Also, the disadvan-
tages are similar to Example 2 in that the pro-
tocol involves public key ciphers so a PKI is re-
quired, and the protocol is costly in relation to
band-width and computation.
Key agreement seems to be the ideal protocol
to use in a distributed environment where no
trusted server is available and the two parties
who wish to set up a secure communication chan-
nel do not trust one another. The reason is that
each party is able to have input into the for-
mat of the session key. One major problem with
key agreement is that each party needs to have
a method to generate random numbers. As de-
scribed in Section 4, this is not a simple pro-
cess. There are many applications such as home
banking where a person is communicating with
a bank (which is usually assumed to be trusted)
where a key transport protocol may be much
more appropriate.
6 Key Storage
Because of the untrusted and distributed nature
of the World Wide Web, key storage is a diffi-
cult problem, but one that must be solved in or-
der to provide a secure key management system,
and thus a secure application. As previously dis-
cussed, the security of any application, whether
distributed or not, hinges upon the protection
of the cryptographic keys. It is pointless gener-
ating and distributing the keys in a secure man-
ner, if the keys are then stored by the end user
in an insecure manner. Two aspects of key stor-
age are described here, namely secure storage
devices and secure storage mechanisms.
6.1 Secure Key Storage Devices
The primary threats to the keys caused by inad-
equate security in the key storage area are that
the user’s keys may be revealed, obtained and/or
misused by an illegitimate person. This could be
an intruder who has managed to gain access to
the user’s key storage area or key storage device,
or a system administrator who has access to the
files stored on the system, or to programs stored
on the system.
It is certainly inadequate to store the keys in the
clear (unencrypted) on a device that is acces-
sible or usable by anyone other than the legit-
imate user. For example, storing the keys on a
shared, network hard drive means that the sys-
tem administrator will most probably have ac-
cess to the keys. If the hard drive is accessed via
the network, any person monitoring the network
will potentially be able to intercept the keys as
they are being transmitted from the hard drive,
over the network, onto the user’s workstation.
Even if the keys are stored in encrypted form,
it is clear that the keys must be temporarily de-
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crypted in order to be used. If this decrypted
key were to be made available, albeit temporar-
ily, to an insecure or untrusted workstation, this
key could be obtained by an attacker or by a
system administrator with appropriate access to
the workstation. For a particular application, it
must be decided if there is a need to protect the
key at all times, ensuring that it is never revealed
to an untrusted source.
A common method of protecting keys is by the
use of a user specific secure computing and stor-
age device, such as a smart card or a processor
based token. In this case, the cryptographic key
to be protected is stored on the smart card, and
the security of the smart card is established in
such a way so that no one can read or retrieve the
key from the smart card. Whenever the key is
needed (to perform a cryptographic operation),
the data to be encrypted or decrypted is sent to
the smart card and the cryptographic work is
performed by the smart card.
This technique allows the user to securely carry
their cryptographic key with them from one lo-
cation to another, and to store this key in a man-
ner that is reasonably secure. Placing the exe-
cution of the cryptographic algorithms on the
smart card also means that the cryptographic
key is never revealed outside the smart card. As
long as trust can be maintained in the smart
card, then the key storage problem can be ad-
dressed using this technique.
Of course, there are several disadvantages to this
technique. A smart card reader is required to in-
terface between the user’s smart card and the
computing workstation. Every user must be is-
sued with a smart card containing appropriate
cryptographic keys (key distribution then be-
comes an issue). Users are required to possess the
smart card (which, depending on the applica-
tion, may actually be an advantage). The smart
cards must thus be managed in a secure manner,
imposing additional administrative overheads.
Despite these problems, smart cards seem to
offer a practical method to store cryptographic
keys in an insecure environment such as the
Internet. The cost of smart cards has greatly
decreased over the past few years. It is antici-
pated that in the future, most computers will
be equipped with smart card readers, and most
operating systems will have functions to access
smart cards and smart card readers.
In any system that incorporates the use of smart
cards, the security policy must be clear in the
responsibilities of each entity as to the use and
management of each smart card. Ultimately, the
user must bear some responsibility, in this case
to properly manage their own smart card.
6.2 Secure Key Storage Mechanisms
In addition to selecting a particular device for
key storage, appropriate mechanisms are needed
to support the storage of these keys. The appli-
cation of cryptography to certain communica-
tions systems may require complex key storage
mechanisms. For example, key recovery mecha-
nisms may be required for legal wire-tapping or
for audit trails in secure electronic commerce.
In the case where public key ciphers are used
in the security architecture a PKI will be re-
quired. As described in Section 5.1 a PKI will
need mechanisms to support certificates. A cer-
tificate authority structure may greatly increase
the complexity and cost of the security architec-
ture. Currently it may cost several hundred dol-
lars to obtain a certificate from a private issuer
in the USA [18].
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7 Security Architectures
There are a multitude of applications that run
in a non-trusted distributed environment, such
as the World Wide Web, that require secure key
management. In fact, any application that relies
on being able to securely identify an entity, or be-
ing able to ensure data confidentiality, integrity
or authenticity requires secure key management.
Examples of applications that operate in a non-
trusted distributed environment that require se-
cure key management include the following.
• Internet banking
• Home shopping
• Credit card purchasing over the Internet
• Share market transactions
• Electronic Mail
A number of security architectures have been
applied to each of the examples above. We now
give a brief description of some of these archi-
tectures highlighting the key management tech-
niques used in each system.
7.1 Secure Sockets Layer
The Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) [7] is a proto-
col which was originally proposed by Netscape
to provide security services for the World Wide
Web. SSL is now supported by most WWW
browsers and servers and has also been incor-
porated into a number of other networking ap-
plications - for example, TELNET and FTP.
SSL provides for mutual authentication using
certificates, although in most applications only
the server is authenticated. SSL provides no so-
lutions to the key generation problem, instead
the application is responsible for generating
random data. In fact, an early version of the
Netscape Navigator used a predictable seed
for its random number generator, leading to a
much-publicised attack [10]. The SSL specifi-
cation suggests two alternatives for key distri-
bution - RSA and Diffie-Hellman. As discussed
above, the use of RSA requires one party to
generate a session key, where-as Diffie-Hellman
requires input from both parties. SSL does not
specify any key storage requirements, leaving
that task to the implementor of the application.
7.2 Secure Shell
The Secure Shell (SSH) [17,19] is an application
used mostly as a secure replacement to TELNET
and RSH (remote shell) for connecting to Unix
computers over the network. SSH can also be
used to securely transfer files between Unix com-
puters and also between client hosts and Unix
servers. SSH prevents passwords from being ex-
posed on the network in the clear. As well as
allowing the traditional username/password au-
thentication on Unix hosts, SSH also allows users
to identify themselves using public key cryptog-
raphy. SSH provides a tool for users to gener-
ate their own public/private key pairs. Depend-
ing on the platform of the SSH client (it could,
for example, be a Microsoft Windows client or
a Unix client), different techniques are used for
seeding the random number generator. The F-
Secure SSH client for MS Windows initialises
its seed using mouse movement. The Unix client
gathers environmental information from the op-
erating system which it combines to form a seed.
In both cases the seed is stored in a file locally
and updated each time keys are generated. In
the SSH protocol, the client generates the ses-
sion key and sends it to the server encrypted un-
der the server’s public key. User’s RSA private
keys are stored on the client computer’s file sys-




Kerberos [12] is a security architecture devel-
oped by Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT) in the mid 1980s. Kerberos is a purely
symmetric key based architecture originally de-
veloped for a university environment with the
aim of providing tighter authentication mecha-
nisms than the traditional password based sys-
tems as well as privacy services. Kerberos al-
lows single sign-on to the network, relinquishing
the user of the need to repeatedly enter user-
name/password information for each new appli-
cation.
Kerberos makes use of an on-line Authentication
Server (AS) and Ticket Granting Server (TGS)
in its architecture. The AS authenticates users
and provides them with a Ticket Granting Ticket
(TGT). This is the sign-on phase in the Ker-
beros protocol. The TGT contains information
about the user and their privileges. When the
user wishes to contact a server (using client soft-
ware), they pass their TGT to the TGS which
authenticates the user’s request before generat-
ing a Server ticket which it returns to the user.
The ticket contains a session key which can be
used for communicating with the server appli-
cation. Thus, in the Kerberos environment the
TGS is required to generate session keys. Ses-
sion keys are also generated by the AS (during
authentication) and may also be generated by
the application server if necessary. In any case,
Kerberos never requires the user to generate a
session key so only the servers (AS, TGS, appli-
cation servers) require good key generation fa-
cilities.
As with all purely symmetric key based systems,
there is the requirement for an initial shared se-
cret. In the case of Kerberos the user shares a
password with the AS. This password is used as
a symmetric key when the user first contacts the
AS. It is also used by the AS in its response to
the user.
Kerberos does not define any specific techniques
for key generation. Key storage is performed by
the AS which must store each of the users pass-
words for the purpose of authenticating the users
and encrypting communications sent from the
AS to the user. If the AS is compromised then it
is possible to masquerade as any user. The TGS
also stores keys in its ticket cache. If the TGS
is compromised then all future session keys and
possibly past session keys (stored in the ticket
cache) can be obtained giving the perpetrator
the ability to listen in to, and modify any future
sessions between users and servers and to view
past sessions.
7.4 Sesame
Similar to Kerberos, Sesame [1] is a distributed
security architecture which improves on Ker-
beros by adding (among other things) public key
cryptography. Sesame was developed in a joint
research project between Bull, ICL and Siemens
– all European based companies. Sesame sup-
ports all of the symmetric key protocols that
are implemented but has also been extended to
incorporate the use of certificates.
Sesame uses the same “single sign-on” concept
as Kerberos through the use of the Authentica-
tion Server (AS) which is part of Sesame’s Do-
main Security Server (DSS). In the Sesame ar-
chitecture, the DSS returns to the user a Priv-
ilege Attribute Certificate (PAC) which defines
the users privileges. The PAC must be submit-
ted to the application server on connecting. An
additional feature of Sesame is that it makes use
of role-based access control (RBAC) to restrict
users access based on their role in an organisa-
tion.
In Sesame, since the user has a public private
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key pair, it is possible for the user and the AS to
communicate without the need for a prior shared
secret (provided that the user trusts the public
key of the AS and vice versa). Also, the client
can now generate the session key and send it
to the application server using their public key.
Thus, key generation is now the responsibility
of the client, or it can be a shared responsibility
with the server using a Diffie-Hellman-like pro-
tocol. In any case, the need for a ticket granting
server is no longer present. For Sesame, key stor-
age is required by each user and each server in
order to store their private key. Sesame option-
ally supports the use of secure cryptographic to-
kens (such as smart cards) for this purpose.
Sesame applications are now available for com-
mon Internet protocols such as TELNET,
RLOGIN and Remote Procedure Call (RPC) [2].
This appears to provide a more secure archi-
tecture including better key management than
earlier systems such as Kerberos, especially in
an Internet environment.
7.5 PGP
PGP [16] (Pretty Good Privacy) is perhaps the
most widely used application for securing elec-
tronic mail. PGP utilises its own public key
mechanism. Rather than using a hierarchical
model, PGP uses a peer-based model where
users keys are signed by their peers, creating
a “web of trust”. In this model, for example,
if A trusts B, and B trusts C, then A should
trust C. There is no one method for distributing
the master public keys of each user. Users are
responsible for the distribution process of mas-
ter public keys. This is usually done through a
different channel, by electronic mail, through
a web page, or physically transferred on elec-
tronic media such as floppy disks. These master
public keys are used to encrypt message keys,
and these message keys are then used to encrypt
each individual message.
The Unix version of PGP utilises key-stroke tim-
ings (the difference in time between successive
key-strokes) to generate a seed before generating
a public/private key pair. A random seed file is
stored for each user - initially based on the key-
stroke timings - which is updated each time a
symmetric or asymmetric key is generated. PGP
secret keys are stored on the host file system en-
crypted under a pass-phrase designated by the
user.
8 Conclusions
In this paper we have outlined the most impor-
tant aspects of key management and its require-
ments for use in Internet applications such as
the World Wide Web. The key areas of key gen-
eration, key distribution and key storage have
each been described in detail and a number of
examples of applications using these technolo-
gies have been given.
The lack of a global PKI has impeded the wide-
spread use of cryptographic protocols on the In-
ternet. A number of solutions are currently in use
but these systems are not gaining wide accep-
tance due to the lack of a global PKI. A number
of hardware devices are available to assist with
secure key generation and key storage but the
wide-spread use of such devices will take time.
As technology improves, and the problems asso-
ciated with the development of a global PKI are
gradually solved, a greater amount of trust in the
use of cryptography to secure applications such
as those outlined in this paper will be achieved.
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